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IDAHO’S ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE—AN INEFFECTIVE, COSTLY, AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ERADICATION
The fury of a demon instantly possessed me. I knew myself no longer. My
original soul seemed at once to take its flight from my body. And a more
than fiendish malevolence, gin nurtured, thrilled every fiber of my frame.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Late on a Sunday night in 1987, Robert Serravo returned home from work.2
He sat in his kitchen and read from the Bible.3 Overcome with religious delusions,
Serravo believed that God sent him on a mission to convert others to his religious
ideals.4 To accomplish his mission, Serravo believed he needed to “establish a religious community by constructing a sports complex dedicated to God.”5 But he felt
his wife did not support his mission, and he believed that God wanted him to kill
her “to prevent her from being an obstacle in his way.” 6 After reading the Bible,
1. EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Black Cat, in TALES OF EDGAR ALLEN POE 22, 25 (1965).
2. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo. 1992).
3. Id.
4. People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990).
5. Margaret E. Clark, The Immutable Command Meets the Unknowable Mind: Deific Decree
Claims and the Insanity Defense after People v. Serravo, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 161, 175 (1992).
6. Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782.
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Serravo went upstairs to his bedroom where his wife was asleep.7 He stood over
her for a few minutes, and then he stabbed his sleeping wife in the back with a
knife.8 The stab wound was not fatal and his wife woke up. 9 Because she survived,
Serravo believed she had passed a “divine test” and “would no longer be uncooperative” with his mission.10 Serravo then told his wife that an intruder stabbed her.11
Encouraging her to wait in bed, he went downstairs to call for medical assistance. 12
When the police arrived, Serravo told them that he was downstairs reading the Bible when he heard the front door slam shut. 13 Serravo claimed he went upstairs to
check on his wife when he saw her bleeding in bed.14
Weeks later, Serravo’s wife found letters he wrote, in which he confessed to
stabbing her.15 The letters read, “I have gone to be with Jehovah in heaven for three
and one-half days,” and “I must return for there is still a great deal of work to be
done.”16 When Serravo’s wife confronted him, he told her that God commanded
him to stab her.17 Serravo’s wife informed the police of the letters and Serravo’s
confession, and he was arrested and charged with attempted murder. 18
Because Colorado has an insanity defense statute,19 Serravo pled insanity as a
defense to his crime.20 Colorado articulates the insanity defense standard as, “A
person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the
act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act is
not accountable.”21 At trial, the court instructed the jury that the phrase “incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong” refers to a person who understands that his
conduct is criminal but, as a result of a mental disease or defect, believes that conduct is morally right.22 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.23 The Supreme Court of Colorado approved the verdict, noting that “a defendant
may be judged legally insane where, as here, the defendant’s cognitive ability to
distinguish right from wrong with respect to an act charged as a crime has been
destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has ordered him to commit
the act.” 24 Because Serravo suffered from such psychotic delusions in which he
believed that God commanded him to murder his wife, the court affirmed Serravo’s

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Serravo, 823 P.2d at 130.
Id.
Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782.
Serravo, 823 P.2d at 130.
Id.
Id. at 130–31.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Serravo, 823 P.2d at 131.
Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-103 (West 2014).
People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-101 (West 2014).
Serravo, 797 P.2d at 782.
Id.
People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo. 1992).
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acquittal under the insanity defense.25 And pursuant to Colorado’s insanity defense
statute, the court committed Serravo to a state hospital for treatment.26
Fast-forward fifteen years later, to June 29, 2002. John Cope was watching
TV in his Lewiston, Idaho, apartment.27 His landlord, Brian Elliot, knocked on the
door to remind Cope that he had three days to move out. 28 Cope initially refused to
answer the door.29 But when Elliot came back seconds later and again knocked,
Cope believed he heard God command him, “finish him off he’s the mark of the
beast. Get your knife and answer the door.”30 Cope opened the door.31 Because he
thought “[Elliot] was the mark of the beast,” Cope murdered Elliot.32 He slit Elliot’s neck and then mutilated the severed head.33 Upon cutting his own hand during the murder, Cope went to the hospital covered in blood, acting “psychotic,” and
rambling on about “letting the beast out.” 34 Cope told the police that he was “‘being
tormented by the mark of the beast’ and when the ‘mark of the beast’ came to his
door, he cut the beast’s head off with a knife.” 35
The state charged Cope with first-degree murder.36 He was initially found unfit to proceed with trial, but four months later the court determined that he was
competent to proceed. 37 At trial, expert witnesses testified as to Cope’s mental
health problems.38 Prior to the murder charge, Cope was involuntarily committed
on three separate occasions in Idaho.39 Even when he was released, Cope was noncompliant with his outpatient treatment, which made his mental health further deteriorate and caused him to be aggressive and violent. 40 In addition, he was homeless,
suffered from alcoholism, and lacked a support system.41 The trial judge noted, “I
am concerned, I have to be concerned about the fact that there does not seem to be
any kind of outpatient setting that can handle your state of mental illness.” 42 And
yet, despite the seriousness of Cope’s condition, Idaho’s ban on the insanity defense precluded Cope from pleading insanity in hopes of receiving necessary treatment.43 While the trial judge recognized Cope’s serious mental health problems, he
also understood that releasing Cope back into society, untreated, would pose a
threat to himself and to his community.44 With nowhere else to send Cope, the trial
25. Id. at 132.
26. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 2014) (“If the trier of fact finds the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the department of
human services until such time as he is found eligible for release.”).
27. State v. Cope, 129 P.3d 1241, 1243, 142 Idaho 492, 494 (2006).
28. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
29. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
30. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
31. See Cope, 129 P.3d at 1243, 142 Idaho at 494.
32. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
33. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
34. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
35. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
36. Id., 142 Idaho at 494.
37. Cope, 129 P.3d at 1244, 142 Idaho at 495.
38. Id. at 1249–51, 142 Idaho at 500–02.
39. Id. at 1250, 142 Idaho at 501.
40. Id., 142 Idaho at 501.
41. Id., 142 Idaho at 501.
42. Id., 142 Idaho at 501.
43. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2004).
44. Cope, 129 P.3d at 1251, 142 Idaho at 502.
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judge sent him to prison.45 Aware of the need to protect society, the trial judge
sentenced Cope to a fixed life sentence.46 But an insanity defense would have enabled the judge to send Cope to a state mental hospital.47
What is the difference between Robert Serravo and John Cope? Both men
heard voices from God, commanding them to kill their victims, and both men acted
on those commands. 48 Both men took similar actions based on similar states of
mind. But while their states of mind were similar, their states of residence were
different —and the difference mattered: Serravo went away to be rehabilitated,
while Cope, perhaps the more delusional of the two, went to prison to be punished.49 Because Idaho abolished the insanity defense, a sick man sits in an overburdened, underprepared prison instead of in a hospital suited to treat him, costing
Idaho money and security in the process.50 This Article suggests that is the wrong
approach.
Idaho must repeal its ban on the insanity defense. The insanity defense is required under due process of the law, it promotes justice because it advances the
goals of punishment, and it effectively rehabilitates mentally insane criminal defendants and lowers recidivism rates, thereby saving money.51 Part II of this Article
describes the origins and transformation of the insanity defense throughout ancient
history and also explores the modern concepts of the insanity defense. Part III focuses on various challenges to the abolition of the insanity defense, specifically in
Washington, Nevada, Mississippi, Arizona, and, most relevant to this Article, Idaho. Part IV describes the goals of punishment in relation to mentally insane criminals, in an effort to demonstrate that the insanity defense advances the goals of punishment, whereas the lack of an insanity defense actually impedes the accomplishment of these goals. Part V explains that mens rea, which is the “state of mind that
the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when
committing a crime,” has two components.52 These two components are intent and
moral blameworthiness, one of which has been abandoned in some states, including
Idaho.53 Part V also argues that said elimination has been justified by an argument
45. Id. at 1251, 142 Idaho at 502.
46. Id. at 1232, 142 Idaho at 494.
47. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 2014) (“If the trier of fact finds the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the department of human services until such time as he is found eligible for release.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
15A-1321 (West 2014) (a “defendant [who] has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a crime” will
be committed to a “Forensic Unit operated by the Department of Health and Human Services . . .”); Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–64 (1983) (holding that a finding of insanity at trial is “sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment” to a mental hospital); United States v.
Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant who was convicted of murder and rape was sent to a
psychiatric hospital because he was mentally insane).
48. Compare People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782, 782 (Colo. App. 1990), with Cope, 129 P.3d at
1243, 142 Idaho at 494.
49. Compare People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 132 (Colo. 1992), with Cope, 129 P.3d at 1251,
142 Idaho at 502.
50. See infra Part VI.
51. See generally Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of
the Constitutional Implications of “Abolishing” the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1541
(2002) (stating that “one can only arrive at the conclusion that due process prohibits the elimination of the
extrinsic insanity defense.”).
52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
53. See infra Part V.
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that a single-prong interpretation of mens rea is sufficient to stand in for an insanity
defense, but in fact such an interpretation constitutes a violation of due process
rights. Finally, Part VI illustrates how adopting an insanity defense will save Idaho
money in the long run. The goal of this Article is to portray the need for an insanity
defense in order to comply with the fundamental principles of the law and to effectively rehabilitate in order to treat those who need to be treated, such as John Cope,
and to subsequently reduce crime and save money in Idaho.
II. HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Ancient History
The origins of the insanity defense trace back to second century Jewish law.54
The Talmud, a collection of Jewish codes dating back to biblical times, reads, “It is
an ill thing to knock against a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor. He that wounds
them is culpable, but if they wound others they are not culpable . . . for with them
only the act is a consequence while the intention is of no consequence.”55 While
imbeciles, as we know them today, are not necessarily mentally insane, the ancient
Talmud reflects an attempt to relate criminal culpability to one’s state of mind and
mental faculties.56 Specifically, the Talmud distinguished between a criminal defendant of sound mind, who is legally responsible for his actions, and a criminal
defendant of a lower mental capacity, an “imbecile,” who is not legally responsible
for his actions.57 Thus, while defendants who harmed those with a diminished mental capacity were held morally blameworthy and legally responsible, defendants
with a diminished mental capacity were precluded from moral blameworthiness
and, subsequently, legal responsibility.58
Traces of legal codes that established insanity defenses and distinguished
mentally insane defendants from sane defendants are also found in Ancient Roman
history.59 For instance, the Justinian Code in the sixth century declared mentally
insane criminals unaccountable due to their illnesses. 60 The Digest of Justinian
reads, “An infant or a madman who kills a man [i]s not liable . . . [he is] excused by
the misfortune of his condition.” 61 Because the mentally insane lacked the overt
intention to commit wrongdoings, such individuals were incapable of producing
wrongdoings under the Justinian Code.62

54. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 10 (1988).
55. Id.; Marvin H. Firestone, Psychiatric Patients and Forensic Psychiatry, in LEGAL MED. 621
(Am.
Coll.
of
Leg.
Med.
ed.,
7th
ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.ablminc.org/Model_Curriculum_LMME_2010/BOOK_Legal%20Medicine-7th_2007/Ch67Psychiatric%20Patients%20and%20Forensic%20Psychiatry.pdf.
56. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BABA KAMMA 50102 (Isidore Epstein ed., 1935), available at http://halakhah.com/babakamma/babakamma_87.html#87a_14.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10.
60. Id.
61. 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, BOOK 48, 8: Lex Cornelia on Murders and Prisoners, 12:
Modestinus (Paul Kreuger et al. eds., 1985).
62. Id.; SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10.
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Anglo-Saxon law further developed the insanity defense.63 In the fourteenth
century, King Edward III of England recognized insanity as a complete defense to
crimes.64 In fact, the earliest record of an English jury acquitting a defendant due to
insanity dates back to 1505.65 And by 1581, the insanity defense was well established in English common law.66 That year, William Lambarde, an English legal
writer and scholar, wrote, “[i]f a madman or natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of
his lunacy do [kill a man], this is no felonious act for they cannot be said to have
any understanding will.” 67 Thus, English common law maintained that without
“any understanding will,” such as a specific intention to harm at the time of the
wrongdoing, no accountability rested upon the insane defendant.68
In 1723, an English court in Rex v. Arnold applied the “wild beast test,” holding that an insane defendant could only use the insanity defense if he was “totally
deprived of his understanding and memory so as to not know what he is doing, no
more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast.” 69 Simply put, the “wild beast test”
required a defendant lack any sense of reasoning power, 70 so that the defendant had
acted less, if at all, like a human and more similar to a beast, which almost completely lacks mental faculties. The wild beast test remained the insanity defense
standard for more than a century.71
In an attempt to leave the wild beast test behind, shifting focus more towards
morality, an English judge presiding over a murder case in 1812 held that “distinct
and unquestioned evidence” must demonstrate that the defendant was unable to
distinguish between right and wrong. 72 But the “right and wrong” test proved difficult to apply to mentally insane criminal defendants, since even knowledge that an
act is wrong does not necessarily mean the defendant is culpable.73
Such standards were abandoned over time, largely due to difficulties in applying the different rules and disagreements over the meaning of terms and phrases. 74
But an English case, Queen v. M’Naghten,75 left its mark in the history of the insanity defense that still influences criminal jurisprudence today. 76
63. See SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley: A Brief History of the Insanity Defense, PBS
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/history.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2014) [hereinafter From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley].
68. Id.
69. Rex v. Arnold, (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (Eng.); SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at
1011 n.16.
70. Christopher Hawthorne,”Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1793 (2000).
71. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973, 998–99 (2001); Norman J. Finkel et al., Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors’ Perspective, 9 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 77 (1985).
72. EDWIN MAXEY, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES 21 (1915).
73. Id.
74. See Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n & American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law as
Amici Curiae inSuppor of Petitioner, Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012) (No. 11-1515), 2012 WL
2930901, at *5–6 [hereinafter Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n].
75. Queen v. M’Naghten, [1843] 2 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.); 10 Clark & F. 200.
76. J.C. Oleson, Is Tyler Durden Insane?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 579, 605 (2007). The following states
have adopted the rule from M’Naghten, or a modification of the M’Naghten rule, as the insanity defense
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B. Modern History
1. The M’Naghten Test
In the highly influential 1843 M’Naghten case, a jury found the defendant, a
paranoid schizophrenic who was charged with murder, not guilty on grounds of
insanity.77 The defendant, Daniel M’Naghten, believed, due to his paranoid schizophrenia, that the Prime Minister of England, Sir Robert Peel, was persecuting him
and attempting to murder him.78 M’Naghten sought help from the police, but the
police rejected his requests for protection.79 Thus, M’Naghten, believing he had no
other resort, took matters into his own hands and attempted to assassinate Sir Robert Peel. 80 But M’Naghten mistook Sir Robert Peel’s secretary, Edward Drummond, for his actual target. 81 And with premeditation and intention, M’Naghten
shot and killed Drummond.82
At trial, the House of Lords instructed the jury, “[i]f the prisoner was not sensible at the time he committed the act, that it was a violation of the law of God or of
man, undoubtedly he was not responsible for that act or liable to any punishment
flowing from that act.”83 Somewhat creating a hybrid of the wild beast test and the
right and wrong test, each of which proved inadequate on its own, the House of
Lords held that “persons [lacked] criminal capacity if they did not know what they
were doing or were unable to distinguish between right and wrong, even if their
mental derangement fell a little short of total deprivation of mind and memory.” 84
Thus, under the M’Naghten test, the defendant must have either not known the “nature and quality of [what] he was doing” or, if he knew the nature and quality of
what he was doing, he was unaware of the wrongfulness of his crime.85 The jury
standard: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (2014); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010
(2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 2014); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-8-101.5 (2014); FLA. STAT. § 775.027 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (2014); IOWA CODE §
701.4 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 552-030
(2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1
(West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (West
2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-5-10, 22-1-2 (2014); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (2014); In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340, 1347
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978); White v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 353, 356–57 (Va. 2006); see also Laney v.
State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986).
77. M’Naghten, 2 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Clark & F.200; Oleson, supra note 76, at 603–05; SIMON &
AARONSON, supra note 54, at 12.
78. Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 15 (2007); Jenny Williams, Reduction
in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal Defendants: Kansas Upholds the Replacement of the
M’Naughten Approach with the Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense, 44
WASHBURN L.J. 213, 218 (2004).
79. Williams, supra note 78, at 218.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 12.
83. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 13; Queen v. M’Naghten, [1843] 2 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L.); 10 Clark & F. 200.
84. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 14; M’Naghten, 2 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Clark & F.200.
85. Judith A. Morse & Gregory K. Thoreson, Criminal Law – United States v. Lyons: Abolishing the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177, 179 (1984).

582

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51

had to find the defendant not guilty on grounds of insanity if the jury found that
the defendant either did not know the nature and quality of what he did, or did not
know that what he did was wrong.86 So, unlike the wild beast test, the M’Naghten
test held that the defendant need not suffer from a total departure of the mind.87
Because the jury was persuaded by testimony that M’Naghten suffered from
delusions that impaired his ability to know the nature and quality of what he was
doing, and because the jury believed that M’Naghten’s paranoid schizophrenia prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong, the jury acquitted M’Naghten.88
The court subsequently committed M’Naghten to an asylum, where he spent the
rest of his life.89
By 1851, courts all over the United States adopted the M’Naghten rule as an
insanity defense standard that functioned as an affirmative defense to the crime
charged.90 In fact, in 1946, the United States Supreme Court first upheld the Court
of Appeals’ application of the M’Naghten standard in Fisher v. United States.91 For
over 100 years, until the mid-1990’s, the United States judicial systems and legislatures used the M’Naghten rule to exonerate mentally insane criminal defendants.92
During that time, only one state, New Hampshire, departed from the M’Naghten
rule.93
2. The Durham Test
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia modified the
M’Naghten rule and adopted what became known as the “product rule.” 94 In
Durham v. United States, the Court held “an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”95 In effect,
the Court in Durham adopted a rule favorable to mentally insane criminals because
it rendered mental diseases and defects as justifications for criminal acts, thus
avoiding criminal responsibility. 96 Moving away from the moral right versus wrong
implications in the M’Naghten standard, the Durham rule applied science to formulate an insanity defense standard.97 But the rule was not widely accepted outside the
psychiatry world.98 Because the test opened up the doors for any defendant with
any kind of mental disease or defect to plead insanity, many critics of the Durham

86. Oleson, supra note 76, at 605.
87. See id.
88. Fradella, supra note 78, at 16.
89. Id.
90. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 14.
91. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946). The jury was instructed, “[i]nsanity, according to the criminal law, is a disease or defect of the mind which renders one incapable to understand the
nature and quality of his act, to know that it is wrong, to refrain from doing the wrongful act.” Id. at 467 n.3.
92. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
93. See infra Part II.B.3.
94. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874–75.
96. See id.
97. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
98. SIMON & AARONSON, supra note 54, at 52.
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rule were concerned that the rule would lead to acquittals of defendants who needed to be held accountable.99
3. The Model Penal Code Test
Less than a decade later, in response to the debates over an adequate insanity
defense standard, the American Law Institute (ALI) formulated a model insanity
test.100 The test, articulated in Model Penal Code § 4.01 and created in 1962, states,
[A] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.101
In effect, similar to the Durham test, the ALI test incorporates scientific evidence to
determine whether an alleged mentally insane criminal defendant should be held
responsible for his crime. 102 But unlike the Durham test, the Model Penal Code test
does not apply to defendants “whose mental illness or defect only manifests itself
in criminal or antisocial conduct.” 103 In effect, the Model Penal Code test excludes
defendants who only exhibited their mentally insane symptoms through criminal
acts.104 Such mentally insane symptoms had to have been exhibited through various
aspects of the defendants’ lives,105 not only through their criminal conduct. Thus,
this test limits the number of defendants held unaccountable due to the insanity
defense. Deemed the most “influential and widely used” insanity test in the United
States, “half of the states and the federal courts” adopted the Model Penal Code
test.106
4. The Brawner Test
The Supreme Court adopted a variation of the Model Penal Code test when it
overruled Durham in 1972.107 Finding the Durham insanity defense test impractical
and difficult to carry out, 108 the Court in United States v. Brawner adopted a hybrid
rule.109 Brawner first incorporated a definition articulated in McDonald v. United
States, a 1962 case that defined a mental disease or defect as “any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects [mental] or emotional processes and

99. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
100. Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2013).
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2013).
102. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 76 A.3d 920, 924 (D.C. 2013) (noting that the defendant
had suffered from delusions since a young age).
106. Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., Practice Guideline: Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S6 (Supp. 2002), available at
http://www.aapl.org/docs/pdf/Insanity%20Defense%20Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Practice Guidelines:
Insanity Defense Evaluations].
107. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 991.
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substantially impairs behavior controls.” 110 Next, Brawner adopted the Model
Penal Code insanity defense standard.111 Thus, the Brawner insanity defense rule is
two-fold. 112 First, the Court defines a mental disease or defect according to the
McDonald definition. 113 The second component of the test derives from Model
Penal Code § 4.01, which, as previously discussed, excuses a mentally insane defendant from criminal responsibility if the defendant, at the time of the crime and
due to his mental illness, either “(i) lacks substantial capacity to appreciate that his
conduct is wrongful, or (ii) lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
law.”114 The Brawner test was formulated in an effort to be narrow and strict,115
unlike the Durham test, which, when applied, resulted in an increased number of
insanity defense acquittees.116
5. The Hinckley Effect
Insanity defense jurisprudence dramatically changed in 1982 after John W.
Hinckley Jr.’s trial, which resulted in a controversial application of the Brawner
insanity defense standard.117 In an effort to impress actress Jodi Foster, Hinckley
attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.118 At Hinckley’s trial, the D.C.
court applied the Brawner test and the prosecution carried the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hinckley was sane. 119 But evidence presented at trial
suggested that Hinckley suffered from schizophrenia. 120 Because the prosecution
was unable to rebut the insanity claim with evidence of Hinckley’s sanity, the jury
concluded the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof. 121 Subsequently,
Hinckley was found “not guilty” by reason of insanity on all counts.122
Hinckley’s acquittal produced outrage across the nation.123 The public felt the
“president’s attacker was being ‘let off.’” 124 Such outraged sparked a debate on the
reformation, and even the abolition, of the insanity defense.125 A law professor stated,

110. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
111. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 991.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Captain Charles E. Trant, The American Military Insanity Defense: A Moral, Philosophical,
and Legal Dilemma, 99 MIL. L. REV. 1, 50 (1983).
116. Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 8 n.33 (2005) (citing THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 92–93 (1985)).
117. Vincent J. Fuller, United States v. John W. Hinckley Jr. (1982), 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699,
699 (2000); Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106 at S6.
118. Fuller, supra note 117, at 699; Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra
note 106, at S6.
119. Donald H.J. Hermann, The Insanity Defense, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 987, 1023 (1983); Fuller, supra note 117, at 699.
120. Hermann, supra note 119, at 1023; Fuller, supra note 117, at 699.
121. Hermann, supra note 119, at 1023; Fuller, supra note 117, at 699.
122. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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The great irony is that [Hinckley] was in some ways the poster boy for the
insanity defense. He was insane. But people wanted revenge. They wanted
him held accountable. They were angry. And they couldn’t take out that
anger on John Hinckley. So instead they took it out on the criminal
code.126
Indeed, prior to the Hinckley trial, all fifty states and the federal government administered some formation of an insanity defense. 127 But since the Hinckley trial, thirtysix states have reformed their insanity defense laws, and four of these states even
completely abolished the insanity defense. 128 Idaho, the state most relevant to this
article, repealed its insanity defense statute in 1982,129 just months after the controversial Hinckley verdict.130 In each of the four states that abolished the insanity defense, evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible to rebut and negate the
mental element (the intent) of the offense charged.131 Thus, instead of implementing an insanity defense, these states have a “Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule” that
permits evidence of mental insanity only in reference to the required intent of the
offense charged.132 But such evidence is otherwise prohibited, and no affirmative
defense exists regarding mental insanity.133
The federal government responded to the aftermath of Hinckley’s trial by
codifying the insanity defense in an attempt to compromise between those who
wanted the insanity defense abolished and psychiatric and legal professionals who
argued merely for a modification of the insanity defense. 134 The Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984 abandoned the Model Penal Code insanity defense standard. 135
The act called for strict qualifications in an effort to “[limit] the scope of insanity
acquittals.”136 In order to use the insanity defense, under the act, a defendant must
“show that his mental disease or defect is ‘severe.’” 137 Further, a defendant must
show that, as a result of his “severe” mental disease or defect, “[he] was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the criminality or wrongfulness of his acts.” 138
The law shifted the burden of proof from the prosecutor onto the defendant in order
126. Jim Acosta et al., Documentary Portrays Criminally Insane — Through Their Own Eyes,
CNN (July 4, 2011, 6:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/02/insanity.defense/.
127. Andrew M. Levine, Denying the Settled Insanity Defense: Another Necessary Step in Dealing with Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 78 B.U. L. REV. 75, 79 (1998).
128. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67. The states that have abolished the insanity defense include Idaho, Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Nevada. Marc W. Pearce & Lori J.
Butts, Insanity in the State of Idaho, 44 Monitor on Psychol. 28, 28 (2013), available at
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/02/jn.aspx. However, in 2011, Nevada’s abolition of the insanity defense
was ruled unconstitutional. Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
129. Pearce & Butts, supra note 128, at 28.
130. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
131. Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Rebecca E. Woodman, The Insanity of the Mens Rea Model: Due
Process and the Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 28 PACE L. REV. 455, 460–61 (2008).
132. Id.
133. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2014).
134. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67; see also The Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2014).
135. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67; see also 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
136. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6; From Daniel
M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a); From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
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to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was “legally insane at the
time of the crime.”139 Combining elements of two previous insanity defense tests,
Congress adopted the “nature and quality” language from the M’Naghten test and
incorporated the term “appreciate” from the Model Penal Code test. 140 Further,
Congress used the “wrongfulness” element of the Model Penal Code test to “describe the types of appreciation in question.” 141 Thus, the law essentially returned to
the historic “right/wrong” test.142 If the defendant met his burden of proof in establishing the affirmative defense, the Act created a “special verdict” of “not guilty by
reason of insanity,” similar to the verdict reached in the Hinckley trial. 143 But such
a verdict was more difficult to obtain, being that the burden, under this act, rested
upon the defendant.144
Courts around the country began to embrace the Insanity Defense Reform
Act, adding some modifications and clarifications.145 While many states have modified their insanity defense tests, few states have continued to avoid readopting the
defense.146 But such abolitions have produced constitutional challenges across the
court system.147 Some challenges have been successful, 148 while others have not.149
III. CHALLENGES TO THE ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. The United States Beyond Idaho
In some states that previously abolished the insanity defense, the courts have
overturned such abolitions, holding that due process of the law requires some kind
of formation of an insanity defense.150 Thus, these states now have the insanity defense, as required under either the federal Constitution, various state Constitutions,
or, in some cases, both.151
For instance, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that a defendant is
denied state constitutional guarantees when he is precluded from consideration of
his insanity at the time he committed the charged offense.152 In fact, in 1910, the
139. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67; 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
140. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6.
141. Id. at S6–S7.
142. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
143. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6.
144. From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 67.
145. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994). The Court held that under the Insanity Defense Reform Act, there was no provision requiring a jury instruction regarding the special verdict
of “not guilty by reason of insanity.” Id. at 575. The Court held that such an instruction was not required,
except in “certain limited circumstances.” Masha Bach, The Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Verdict:
Should Juries be Informed of its Consequences?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 647 (1995).
146. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917, 118 Idaho 632, 635 (1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d
840, 852 (Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1001 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,
390 (Utah 1995).
147. See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 916, 118 Idaho at 634; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 851; Korell, 690 P.2d at
999; Herrera, 895 P.2d at 362.
148. See, e.g., State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1022–25 (Wash. 1910).
149. See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917, 118 Idaho at 634; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 851; Korell, 690 P.2d at
999; Herrera, 895 P.2d at 362.
150. See, e.g., Strasburg, 110 P. at 1022; Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66, 79 (Nev. 2001); Sinclair
v. State, 132 So. 581, 581–82 (Miss. 1931).
151. See, e.g., Strasburg, 110 P. at 1022; Finger, 27 P.3d at 77; Sinclair, 132 So. at 581–82.
152. Strasburg, 110 P. at 1024–25.
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Supreme Court of Washington was the first court to declare the abolition of the
insanity defense unconstitutional. 153 In that case, State v. Strasburg, the court first
recognized that the Washington State Constitution prohibits the deprivation of any
person of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 154 Next, the court
ruled that the issue of insanity is “inherently related to the guilt or innocence” of a
criminal defendant. 155 Finally, the Court emphasized that even in common law,
criminal intent was an “essential element in every crime.” 156 And therefore, in refusing to consider evidence of mental insanity in determining whether criminal
intent exists and in refusing the defendant an opportunity to put forth such evidence
to negate criminal intent, the court in Strasburg declared Washington’s ban on the
insanity defense a violation of due process.157
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court used both the due process clause of the
Nevada Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
to conclude that Nevada’s abolition of the insanity defense was unconstitutional. 158
While recognizing that neither the state nor federal Constitution expressly requires
the insanity defense, the court in Finger v. State found that “both Constitutions
prohibit an individual from being convicted of a criminal offense without possessing the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime.” 159 The court stated that
its reasoning was based upon history.160 Specifically, the court held that the history
of American law demonstrates the fundamental and deeply rooted principle of
criminal law that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime if he lacks understanding of his actions and the requisite criminal intent.161 While the court did not further
delve into the history of American law, it likely referred to the various insanity defense tests that have gone through the American courts and legislatures throughout
the years. Indeed, the court emphasized that “Congress, even in the face of the public outrage following the Hinckley trial, refused to completely abolish the concept
of legal insanity, recognizing that culpability is a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution.”162 In sum, the court in Finger, similar to the court in Strasburg, concluded
that due process requires the opportunity for a criminal defendant to present evidence of his insanity in order to demonstrate that he lacked the required criminal
intent for the crime charged.163
Finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Sinclair v. State, determined that a
statute maintaining insanity was not a defense to the crime of murder was unconstitutional because it violated state due process.164 The concurring opinion relied on
history to argue that the insanity defense has been and is afforded constitutional

153.
9, 51 (1982).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J.
Strasburg, 110 P. at 1021; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (West 2014).
Strasburg, 110 P. at 1024–25.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1021.
Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (Nev. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.; Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 476.
Finger, 27 P.3d at 80.
Id.; State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1021 (Wash. 1910).
Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 582 (Miss. 1931).
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protection.165 “So closely has the idea of insanity as a defense to crime been woven into the criminal jurisprudence of English-speaking countries that it has become a part of the fundamental laws thereof, to the extent that a statute that attempts to deprive a defendant of the right to plead it will be unconstitutional and
void.”166 Thus, similar to the court in Finger, the court in Sinclair based its argument on the history of American law regarding mentally insane defendants.167 But
the court did not solely rely on history. 168 Indeed, the court further proclaimed, “it
is certainly shocking and inhuman to punish a person for an act when he does not
have the capacity to know the act or to judge of its consequences.” 169 And so, drawing on morality, Sinclair confirms the historic principle that criminal defendants
who do not understand their actions or the consequences of their actions should not
be held criminally responsible.
On the other side, the United States Supreme Court recently affirmed Arizona’s limited use of the insanity defense. 170 In Clark v. Arizona, the Court held that
Arizona’s narrow definition of insanity is constitutional. 171 Arizona incorporates
the M’Naghten standard into its insanity defense statute, but it eliminated one component of the M’Naghten standard, cognitive incapacity.172 The cognitive incapacity prong asks whether a defendant, due to a mental defect, was prevented from understanding what he was doing when he committed the charged offense. 173 Thus,
with the elimination of the cognitive capacity prong, Arizona only permitted evidence of mental insanity to disprove moral incapacity, so a defendant could only
obtain a “guilty but mentally insane” verdict if he proved he did not know his criminal act was wrong.174 In sum, mental insanity, under Arizona’s statute, could not
be used to negate mens rea. The Court found the narrowed insanity defense statute
did not violate due process because the M’Naghten standard “did not rise to the
level of a fundamental right.”175 But the Court refused to determine whether the
insanity defense itself is protected by the Constitution. 176
B. Idaho
Today, four states prohibit the insanity defense, including Idaho.177 Years ago,
Idaho had an insanity defense written into law. 178 The Idaho Supreme Court adopt165. Id. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. Id.; Finger, 27 P.3d at 79.
168. See Sinclair, 132 So. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 779 (2006).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 748.
173. Id. at 747.
174. Id. at 752; see also Jennifer Gibbons, Note, Clark v. Arizona: Affirming Arizona’s Narrow
Approach to Mental Disease Evidence, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1155, 1159–60 (2006).
175. Trent Echard, Comment, Clark v. Arizona: Has the Court Painted Itself Into a Corner?, 1
PHOENIX L. REV. 213, 223 (2008).
176. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 752–53.
177. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6. The other states
include Kansas, Utah, and Montana. The Insanity Defense Among the States, FINDLAW,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.html (last visited
October 17, 2014).
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ed the 1962 ALI Model Penal Code test,179 as previously discussed in Part II. However, shortly after the Hinckley trial, in response to public concern and following
many states’ lead, the Idaho legislature reconsidered its adoption of the insanity
defense.180 And in 1982, Idaho completely abolished the insanity defense. 181
The Idaho statute that prohibits the insanity defense reads, “Mental condition
shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.”182 But the statute, I.C. §
18-207, further indicates that evidence relating to the state of mind (mens rea) will
not be prohibited, even if it relates to mental insanity. 183 Thus, in Idaho, evidence of
mental insanity is allowed in for the narrow purpose of demonstrating that the defendant lacked the required criminal intent (i.e., mental element of the offense) for
the crime charged.184 This is an example of a Mens Rea Model evidentiary rule, as
previously discussed,185 that some states have adopted to replace the insanity defense.
In 1990, defendant Barryngton Eugene Searcy challenged Idaho’s ban on the
insanity defense in I.C. § 18-207.186 Searcy argued that the unavailability of the
insanity defense violates due process.187 But the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the
statute.188 Holding that neither the Idaho Constitution nor the United States Constitution expressly requires the insanity defense, the court found that Idaho did not
deprive Searcy of his constitutional rights, specifically due process rights, when
Idaho precluded him from using an insanity defense. 189 The court reasoned that
because I.C. § 18-207 does not prohibit evidence of mental illness if it relates to the
required mens rea of the charged offense, the statute does not violate due process.190 Because Searcy could offer evidence of mental insanity to negate the required mens rea of the offense, the court found he was afforded his due process
rights — despite the fact he could not offer evidence of mental insanity as a separate, affirmative defense to the crime. 191 The existence of a mens rea doctrine in
Idaho was enough for the court in Searcy to affirm the abolition of the insanity defense.192
But Searcy carries with it notable dissenting opinions. One justice, for instance, noted that Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense violates the Idaho Constitution.193 He pointed to Idaho history, emphasizing that “[t]he insanity defense
was well established in the Territory of Idaho at the time of the Idaho Constitution178. See State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 802, 93 Idaho 153, 158 (1969).
179. Id.
180. Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense: What Are We Trying to Prove?, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 151, 155 (1994).
181. Id.
182. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(1) (West 2013).
183. Id. § 18-207(3).
184. See id.
185. See supra Part II.B.5.
186. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 915, 118 Idaho 632, 633 (1990).
187. Id.; 41 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 615 (1985).
188. See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 919, 118 Idaho at 637.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 917, 118 Idaho at 635; 41 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 615 (1985).
191. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 918, 118 Idaho at 636.
192. See id. at 918–19, 118 Idaho at 636–37.
193. Id. at 921, 118 Idaho at 639. The Idaho Constitution reads, “No person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of the law.” IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13.
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al Convention and continued to be part of our jurisprudence until the legislature
purposed to abolished it in 1982. It has been part of the process that was due defendants in criminal cases for virtually the entire existence of our Idaho legal system. It is fundamental to our jurisprudence and is protected by the due process
clauses of art. 1, § 13.”194 In sum, according to this justice, because the insanity
defense is rooted in Idaho history, it is a fundamental principle of criminal law and,
therefore, an abolition of the insanity defense offends due process under the Idaho
Constitution.195
Another justice, in a separate dissent, stated that the abolition of the insanity
defense violates the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 196 In response to the majority’s argument that due process is satisfied
when a defendant has the opportunity to disprove criminal intent with evidence of
mental insanity, this dissent noted that criminal blameworthiness goes beyond
criminal intent, in relation to the required mens rea. 197 In fact, the doctrine of mens
rea relating solely to intent, as adopted by the court of Idaho, and the insanity defense are two separate concerns. 198 Rather, criminal blameworthiness “implies a
certain quality of knowledge and intent transcending a minimal awareness and purposefulness.”199 This dissent indicated that the insanity defense would be rendered
useless if a mens rea doctrine focusing solely on criminal intent could substitute its
place.200 Idaho’s mens rea doctrine, according to this justice, is only concerned with
the culpability of the mind.201 But the insanity defense is concerned with “whether
the guilty mind with which the act is done is a product of voluntary and rational
choice.” 202 Thus, a mens rea doctrine that addresses only intent and not moral
blameworthiness is inadequate in providing due process to mentally insane criminal
defendants.203 The separate and independent existence of the insanity defense, as
demonstrated in history, is of “significance to entitle it to a place in our American
concept of ‘ordered liberty.’” 204 Because this dissent concluded that the abolition of
the insanity defense violates the United States Due Process clause, it did not proceed to address the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 205
More recently, defendant John Joseph Delling challenged the constitutionality
of I.C. § 18-207.206 In 2007, Delling was arrested for the murders of three young
men.207 All three of the victims, his former friends, were shot – one in Boise, Idaho,
194. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 922, 118 Idaho at 640.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 927, 118 Idaho at 645. The United States Constitution reads, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
197. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 935, 118 Idaho at 653.
198. Id. at 927, 118 Idaho at 645.
199. Id. at 935, 118 Idaho at 653 (quoting the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards at
337 (1984)) (emphasis omitted).
200. Id. at 922, 118 Idaho at 635.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 935, 118 Idaho at 653.
203. See Searcy, 798 P.2d at 926–27, 935, 118 Idaho 632, 644–45, 653.
204. Id. at 927, 118 Idaho at 645.
205. Id. at 928, 118 Idaho at 646.
206. State v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709, 711, 152 Idaho 122, 124 (2011).
207. Man Accused of Shooting 3 during Cross-Country Road Trip; High School Link Probed,
USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2007, 9:18 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-10-nevshooting-probed_N.htm.
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one in Moscow, Idaho, and one in Tucson, Arizona. 208 There is no doubt that
Delling was mentally insane at the time of the crime. 209 Indeed, one of the motivating factors for killing his victims was his belief that they were “stealing [his] powers,” he told his brother.210 In fact, Delling believed that the victims were trying to
“destroy his brain.”211 His mother confirmed in an interview, “John was very sick,
and that’s all I can tell you.” 212 As indicated in the record before the district court,
Delling, at the time of the murders, suffered from “severe paranoid schizophrenia, a
mental illness that has, as one of its defining characteristics, delusions that affect an
individual’s beliefs and understandings of what he is doing.” 213 Testimony at trial
revealed that Delling “truly believed, delusionally and tragically, that in order to
save his own life, to keep him [from] being destroyed, he had to stop the people
that he thought were harming him . . . He thought he was doing what he had to do
in order to save himself.”214 Thus, Delling’s paranoid schizophrenia fostered delusions that ultimately led Delling to kill his victims. 215
The state charged Delling with two counts of first-degree murder.216 A year
after being declared unfit to proceed with trial, the district court found that
Delling’s mental state had improved, and he was declared fit to stand trial.217 The
trial judge recognized that Delling, at the time of the murders, was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his criminal conduct. 218 But the court convicted Delling
of murder because he was unable to plea insanity under Idaho law. 219 In effect,
“[t]he state was saying that a man who was so insane that he could not understand
that it was wrong to kill two of his friends was just as culpable as a sane person.” 220
Upon entering into a conditional plea of guilty to two counts of second-degree
murder, in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of concurrent sentences,
the court sentenced Delling to determinate life in prison.221 Delling appealed the
judgment, challenging the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207.222
But Delling lost on appeal.223 Similar to the majority opinion in Searcy, Justice Burdick on the Idaho Supreme Court held that because Idaho’s statute allows
evidence of mental insanity to be considered if it relates to the required mens rea of
the charged crime, the abolition of the insanity defense does not violate a criminal
208. Id.
209. Delling, 267 P.3d at 720, 152 Idaho at 133.
210. Rebecca Boone, Classmate Slaying Suspect Called Erratic, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2007,
8:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/11/AR2007041101994.html.
211. Pearce & Butts, supra note 128.
212. Boone, supra note 210.
213. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *3.
214. Id. at *18.
215. See id. at *3.
216. State v. Delling, 267 P.3d at 711 152 Idaho at 124.
217. Id.
218. Emily Bazelon, Crazy Making: The Supreme Court Is Wrong to Let Idaho Have No Insanity
Defense.,
SLATE
(Nov.
28,
2012,
2:38
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/the_supreme_court_shouldn_t_allo
w_idaho_to_have_no_insanity_defense.html.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Delling, 267 P.3d at 711, 152 Idaho at 124.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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defendant’s due process rights.224 Citing Searcy, Burdick emphasized, “[a]lthough
no longer a separate defense, evidence of mental illness or disability is expressly
permitted by statute to rebut state’s evidence offered to prove criminal intent or
mens rea.” 225 Burdick further noted, “[i]n the absence of an insanity defense,
Delling is still able to present a defense; it just takes a different form.” 226 But Idaho’s mens rea doctrine and the insanity defense produce dramatically different results for a mentally insane defendant, such as Delling, who had the specific intent
to kill. The mens rea doctrine serves no helpful purpose for Delling and in fact inculpates Delling, whereas an insanity defense would exculpate Delling.
Delling appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 2012, but the Court
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.227 Justice Breyer, joined with Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, dissented. 228 In his opinion, Justice Breyer gave
two examples of mentally insane criminal defendants. 229 One of the defendants
believed the victim was a wolf, and he shot and killed the victim, in fear of the perceived wolf.230 The other defendant believed that a wolf ordered him to kill the
human victim, so he shot and killed the human to comply with the wolf’s demand.231 The first defendant, because he lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime
of murder in that he lacked intent to kill a human, is not guilty.232 But the second
defendant, even though mentally insane, would have no defense to the crime of
murder, because he knew he killed a human and he had the requisite criminal intent
to kill the human. 233 Under the current Idaho law, even though both defendants are
mentally insane, the second defendant would be guilty. 234 In Delling’s case, because he knew he was in fact killing human beings, even though he suffered from
delusions that motivated his killings, he had the requisite mens rea and thus had no
defense to his crimes under Idaho law.235 While Delling was unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct, he had the criminal intent to kill humans.236 Thus,
John Joseph Delling is currently in solitary confinement in Idaho’s Maximum Security Institution with a life sentence and no possibility of parole.237
The American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law wrote an Amici Curiae brief in support of Delling.238 The brief first
focused on history to argue that the abolition of the insanity defense is unconstitutional.239 Pointing to Anglo-American history, the brief stressed the rich and deeply
rooted tradition to avoid punishing mentally insane defendants when the crimes
224. Id. at 715–17, 152 Idaho at 128–30.
225. Id. at 716–17, 152 Idaho at 130–31.
226. Id. at 717, 152 Idaho at 130.
227. Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 505.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Delling, 133 S. Ct. at 505.
234. Id.
235. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *20.
236. See id. at *18.
237. State v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709, 711, 152 Idaho 122, 124 (Idaho 2011); Brief of American
Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *3.
238. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *4–5.
239. Id. at *6.

2015]

SPRING EDITION

593

result from an inability to logically understand the nature of one’s act. 240 Noting the
adoption of various insanity defense standards in American history, the brief stated,
“From 1900 through the 1950’s, the M’Naghten standard governed in most jurisdictions, while about one-third of the States added [another variation of the insanity
defense]” and “[by] the early 1980’s the ALI formulation, or some close variant,
governed in the federal courts and in ‘a majority of the country’s jurisdictions.’ ”241
The brief then reached deeper into history, noting the ancient criminal principle that
at least some level of understanding is a prerequisite for culpability. 242 Pointing to
English common law, the brief quoted Sir William Blackstone, who explained that
an act of will is required for criminal culpability. 243 But, according to Blackstone, a
defect or lack of will may arise “in an idiot or a lunatic,” and therefore such individuals are “not chargeable for their acts, if committed when under these capacities.” 244
The Amici Curiae brief then argued that due to the consensus among the
states to adopt and implement some form of an insanity defense, the insanity defense is a fundamental principle of justice.245 In fact, an overwhelming majority of
forty-six states have an insanity defense, and the Court has held that a consensus
among the states is “persuasive evidence” that a “practice is indeed a fundamental
principle of justice.”246 And if both history and the vast majority of the states embrace that principle of justice, the principle is, in fact, fundamental. 247 The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause is violated if
an act or a failure to act, such as the failure to incorporate the insanity defense, “offends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 248 Prior to Delling, the Idaho Supreme
Court addressed this due process argument in State v. Searcy,249 as previously discussed. But the court used the lack of a uniform insanity defense standard to rebut
the argument that the insanity defense has a deep, important history in America and
in Idaho.250 The court held,
The insanity defense has had a long and varied history during its development in the common law. As the understanding of the mental processes
changed over the centuries, the implications of a criminal defendant’s insanity have changed. . . . Not surprisingly, there has resulted a wide dis-

240. Id.
241. Id. at *9–10.
242. Id. at *7.
243. Id. at *7–8.
244. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *8 (citing William Blackstone,
Commentaries 24).
245. Id. at *12–13.
246. Practice Guidelines: Insanity Defense Evaluations, supra note 106, at S6; Brief of American
Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *12–13 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008);
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360–62 (1996)).
247. See Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *4.
248. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517
U.S. 348, 367 (1996); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407–08 (1993); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
169 (1952).
249. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 916–17, 118 Idaho 632, 634–35 (1990).
250. Id. at 917, 118 Idaho at 635.
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parity in the positions taken on this issue both by legislatures and courts in
the various states.251
However, the court in Searcy failed to appreciate the basic notion and common,
historical understanding that a defendant who lacks a rational understanding of his
actions is precluded from criminal culpability. While insanity defense standards
have varied throughout the years, the mere fact that the insanity defense lives on in
the vast majority of the states reflects its fundamental nature and appropriate place
in American law.
IV. THE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT
The Amici Curiae brief further argued that the lack of an insanity defense
does not promote the goals of punishment.252 There are four primary goals of punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. 253 Idaho’s ban
on the insanity defense fails to advance any of them.
A. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation, the first goal of punishment, aims to prevent recidivism, which
is the return to criminal activity after incapacitation.254 In order to prevent recidivism, prison rehabilitation programs help offenders transition back into society as
law-abiding citizens.255 But prison rehabilitation programs do not adequately assist
mentally insane offenders, who require specialized treatment and therapy. 256 Instead of prioritizing rehabilitation, prisons focus primarily on security. 257 The executive director of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law stated, “Generally speaking, correctional institutions are not well equipped to deal with the mentally ill.”258 Rather, such offenders would be more effectively rehabilitated in psychiatric institutions. 259 Even the chief psychologist for the Idaho Department of
Correction, confirmed that, “people with severe mental illness are better treated
outside the prison setting, if possible.”260 But mentally insane criminals, if unable
to use the insanity defense because the state they are in has abolished the insanity
defense, will not go to a psychiatric institution upon conviction.261 Instead, mental251. Id.
252. Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 74, at *14.
253. Stephen M. LeBlanc, Comment, Cruelty to the Mentally Ill: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1281, 1314–23 (2007).
254. Id. at 1319.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1319–20.
257. Marsha M. Yasuda, Comment, Taking a Step Back: The United States Supreme Court’s Ruling in Overton v. Bazzetta, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1831, 1847 (2004) (“[The Court’s] holding recognizes a
valid interest in maintaining the internal security of prisons, but it is carried out at the expense of the goal of
rehabilitation. A more accurate test would be to balance the legitimate interests rather than allowing the
prison to point to just one interest.”).
258. Elizabeth Ommachen, Mentally Ill Criminals Treated Unevenly and Money Talks Cases Illustrate
Challenges
Facing
Judicial
System,
SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Aug.
18,
1996)
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1996/aug/18/mentally-ill-criminals-treated-unevenly-and-money/.
259. LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1319.
260. Ommachen, supra note 258.
261. See LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1319.
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ly insane criminals are forced to use the inadequate prison rehabilitation programs
while serving their sentences.262 Ultimately, such criminals are unlikely to be rehabilitated and more likely to return to prison upon release. 263
B. Retribution
According to the second theory, retribution, the goal of punishment is to impose a suffering on the offender proportional to the harm that his crime caused. 264
Retribution is a backward-looking theory that justifies punishment because crime is
morally wrong and criminals must be held accountable for their wrongdoings.265
While some critics of retribution view the theory as a revenge-seeking goal of punishment, retribution actually seeks to punish primarily because criminals deserve
punishment.266 Retribution does not seek to punish criminals because society wants
them to be punished and society craves revenge–it seeks to punish because the individual criminal deserves punishment for his actions. 267 But mentally insane criminals do not deserve a punishment proportional to their crimes. Retribution only
serves the interests of culpable criminal defendants who act with free will. 268 Because mentally insane criminals, by definition, lack free will over their actions at
the time of their crimes, they are inculpable.269 Indeed, their actions are a result of
their mental illness, rather than their “controllable conscious choice.” 270 Thus, punishing such individuals in proportion to their crimes does not advance the goal of
retribution. Instead, mentally insane criminals should receive lesser sentences reflective of diminished culpability. Recognizing this, the insanity defense enables
courts to send mentally insane criminals to psychiatric institutions. 271
But opponents of the insanity defense maintain that the defense gives criminals a “get out of jail free” card.272 However, this viewpoint fails to acknowledge
the low number of attempts to excuse crime by proving mental insanity in states
that do have the insanity defense. 273 In fact, the insanity defense is attempted in less
than 1% of felony cases.274 And even when a defendant pleads the insanity defense,
success is a long shot due to strict insanity defense standards. 275 When a defendant
is acquitted under the insanity defense, according to the most recent available data,

262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1319–21.
Id. at 1314.
Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 818

(2007).
266. Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1835–36 (1999).
267. Id.
268. See LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1315–16.
269. Id. at 1316.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-105(4) (West 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A1321 (West 2014); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–64 (1983); United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d
178, 181 (1976).
272. Acosta, supra note 126; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 143 (1967).
273. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 272, at 143.
274. Id.
275. Id.; see also, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2013) (excludes defendants who only exhibited symptoms of mental illness through criminal acts).
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85% of the time such defendant is immediately committed to a mental hospital.276
The remaining 14% of acquitted defendants are subject to conditional release and
outpatient treatment.277 Thus, only 1% of acquitted defendants are actually released
into society without restrictions. Further, to compare a mental hospital commitment
to a “get out of jail free” card is to disregard the nature of mental hospitals—they
are not country clubs but instead, they are heavily secured institutions full of sick
patients. Thus, acquittals under the insanity defense are not “ticket[s] to freedom.”278
Even still, defendants attempt to plea insanity in states that do not even have
the insanity defense.279 But without an insanity defense in place to regulate insanity
pleas, courts lack guidance on handling mentally insane defendants. An insanity
defense would assist courts in weeding out frivolous insanity pleas. It would provide courts with strict requirements a defendant must meet to be acquitted under the
insanity defense, 280 and would, in turn, deter defendants from pleading insanity
unless they thought they met the required standard.
In sum, while the insanity defense does not necessarily promote retribution in
the sense that the punishment should fit the crime, it also does not completely fail
to hold mentally insane criminals accountable. The insanity defense does not “let
off” criminals. Rather, it gives mentally insane criminals what they truly deserve—
adequate treatment in a secured facility.
C. Deterrence
Next, the deterrence theory aims to punish in order to discourage the individual offender from committing the crime again and to discourage other potential
offenders from committing the crime. 281 The ultimate goal of deterrence is to prevent future crimes.282 But mentally insane criminals, through punishment, are not
deterred from committing future crimes. 283 Individuals are only deterred if they
“view the lessons” that punishment attempts to teach. 284 But insane people, both
criminals and non-criminals, are unlikely to learn the lessons of what happens when
an offense is committed if such individuals are incapable of even understanding the
nature and consequences of their own criminal actions.285 Indeed,
[i]f the purpose of the law is not only to inflict punishment for the commission of prohibited acts, but to set examples which will restrain others
from doing like acts, it is manifest that the punishment of the insane will
276. Allyson L. Gay, Reforming the Insanity Defense: The Need for a Psychological Defect Plea,
STUDENT PULSE: 2 INT’L STUDENT J. 10, 3 (2010); see also Commitment Following An Insanity Acquittal,
94 HARV. L. REV. 605, 605 (1981).
277. See Gay, supra note 276, at 3.
278. Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 276.
279. See Benito Baeza, Twin Falls Murder Trial Delayed Again, FOX NEWS RADIO (Sept. 30,
2013) http://newsradio1310.com/twin-falls-murder-trial-delayed-again/; see also State v. Delling, 267 P.3d
709, 152 Idaho 122 (2011).
280. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2013).
281. Garvey, supra note 266, at 1830.
282. LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1317.
283. Id. at 1318.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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not prohibit or deter another insane person from doing another similar act;
it can have no effect upon another insane person . . . .286
Also, sane people would not be deterred from the punishment of mentally insane
criminals, since sane people cannot identify with mentally insane criminals and
because the kind of crimes that mentally insane criminals commit are outside the
normal spectrum of crimes.287 Thus, deterrence fails as a justification for punishing
mentally insane criminals because they are unlikely to be deterred from committing
future crimes.
D. Incapacitation
Finally, some people believe that mentally insane criminals, and criminals in
general, should be incarcerated for the duration of their lives because they pose a
danger to their communities.288 Such a belief is based upon the final goal of punishment, incapacitation.289 Under the theory of incapacitation, criminals should be
punished in order to keep them separate from society so that they no longer pose a
danger to their communities.290 Prison sentences indeed incapacitate mentally insane criminals. However, psychiatric institutions also incapacitate such individuals.
But psychiatric institutions do not release mentally insane criminals until they
demonstrate they are no longer a threat to society, which is primarily accomplished
through rehabilitation.291 Prisons release mentally insane criminals when their sentences are up, whether or not they still pose a threat to society. 292 Prisons may, in
fact, worsen a mentally insane criminal’s condition because prison conditions can
be counter-therapeutic.293 Consequently, prisons may release individuals back into
society in an even more dangerous state than when they entered prison.294 Indeed,
once mentally insane individuals are incarcerated, it becomes a “tough cycle to
break.”295 For if mentally insane criminals are not adequately treated, their chances
of recidivism significantly increase and their mental conditions likely worsen. 296
Even courts have taken notice of how ill-suited prisons are for the mentally ill,
opining that it is
deplorable and outrageous that [prisons] appear to have become a repository for a great number [of] mentally ill citizens. Persons who with psy286. Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 584 (Miss. 1931).
287. Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United
States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1482 (2006).
288. LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1321.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.; see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105(4) (2014) (“If the trier of fact finds the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the department of human services until such time as he is found eligible for release.”).
292. LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1321; see also, e.g., § 16-8-105(4).
293. Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 27 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf.
294. LeBlanc, supra note 253, at 1319.
295. Alana Horowitz, Mental Illness Soars in Prisons, Jails While Inmates Suffer, HUFFPOST
(Feb. 4, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/mental-illness-prisons-jailsinmates_n_2610062.html.
296. Id.
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chiatric care could fit will into society, are instead locked away, to become
wards of the state’s penal system. Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they
may be confined in conditions that nurture, rather than abate, their psychoses.297
Thus, incapacitation as a justification for not having an insanity defense fails because mentally insane criminals would be incapacitated in a psychiatric institution,
where they could potentially be kept longer than in prison and where they would be
adequately rehabilitated.
In sum, the abolition of the insanity defense does not promote rehabilitation,
retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. Rather, rehabilitation would be best
served through the insanity defense, and the lack thereof most harms this goal of
punishment. The insanity defense would also advance retribution and incapacitation. Deterrence may simply not be accomplished through punishing or treating
mentally insane criminals, and thus fails to justify the abolition of the insanity defense. Therefore, in order to best promote the goals of punishment, Idaho should
adopt the insanity defense.
V. THE 2-PART MENS REA TEST
State legislatures and courts, including those in Idaho, have ignored an essential component of mens rea—moral blameworthiness. 298 Moral blameworthiness
requires that the defendant have acted with a “free, voluntary, and rational choice to
do evil.”299 However, those who support the abolition of the insanity defense have
interpreted mens rea as pertaining only to intent, specifically, the mental element of
the charged offense.300 History indicates, however, that mens rea is composed of
both elements, criminal intent and moral blameworthiness. 301
The dual nature of mens rea can be traced back to ancient history.302 St. Augustine, around 600 AD, likely coined the term “mens rea” in his writings.303 The
dual nature of mens rea was first introduced in the thirteenth century. 304 During that
time, Henry Bracton, a judge who influenced common law, wrote, “[W]e must consider with what mind . . . or with what intent . . . a thing is done . . . . For take away
the will and every act will be indifferent, because your state of mind gives meaning
to your act, and a crime is not committed unless the intent to injure . . . intervene . .
. .”305 To summarize, while the “with what intent” component speaks to the mental
element of the charged offense, the “with what mind” component speaks to moral
blameworthiness. 306 “With what mind” asks whether the defendant either acted

297. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
298. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2014); Mont.
Code Ann. § 46-14-102 (West 2014); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (West 2014).
299. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 665 (1993).
300. See, e.g., State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 118 Idaho 632 (1990).
301. Id. at 917, 118 Idaho at 635; Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 463–67.
302. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 988 (1932).
303. Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 463.
304. See id. at 464.
305. Id. (alteration in original).
306. See id.
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with a morally blameworthy state of mind, so as to make him culpable, or failed to
recognize or appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, so as to make him inculpable.307 The early courts adopted the duality of mens rea when they chose to examine both intent and moral blameworthiness. 308 And in the fourteenth century, courts
began to use the absence of moral blameworthiness and criminal intent as a complete defense to crimes.309
Perhaps more importantly, the dual nature of mens rea is also rooted in English common law, which has guided American law in determining fundamental
principles of law.310 In 1765, Sir William Blackstone wrote the Commentaries on
the Laws of England, a treatise on English common law that has heavily influenced
American law.311 In the treatise, Blackstone wrote, “to constitute a crime against
human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”312 By requiring a vicious will, English common
law embraced the moral blameworthiness component of mens rea.313 In addition,
the insanity defense test in M’Naghten, as discussed in Part II, required that a defendant must either not have known the “nature and quality of what he was doing”
or, if he knew the nature and quality of what he was doing, “he did not know that
[what] he was doing was wrong.”314 The test, which inquired into whether a defendant could choose between right and wrong, sought to determine criminal responsibility based on moral blameworthiness. 315
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the duality of mens rea.316 Explaining that criminal responsibility goes
beyond a specific intent to act, the Court noted,
One who [acts] cannot be said to be actuated by malice aforethought, or to
have deliberately [acted], or to have ‘a wicked, depraved, and malignant
heart,’ or a heart ‘regardless of society duty and fatally bent on mischief,’
unless at the time he had sufficient mind to comprehend the criminality or
the right and wrong of such an act.”317
Essentially, the Court emphasized the importance of focusing not solely on intent,
but also on moral blameworthiness—whether the defendant comprehended the
right or wrong nature of his act.318 Going back to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Delling
v. Idaho,319 under the dual nature of mens rea, the second defendant, who killed a
human because he believed a wolf ordered him to kill, would not be held criminally
307. See id.
308. Gardner, supra note 299, at 665.
309. Id. at 665–66.
310. Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 462–63, 467.
311. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 491–92 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
312. Kelly A. Swanson, Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting Public Welfare Offenses--In Re C.R.M., 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (2002).
313. See Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 466.
314. Morse & Thoreson, supra note 85, at 179.
315. Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 468.
316. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 (1895).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 505–06 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
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responsible.320 Instead, because he lacked the ability to understand and appreciate
the wrongfulness of his murder, the second defendant, along with the first defendant, would escape criminal culpability and instead be sent to a psychiatric institution.321
However, over time, courts and legislatures narrowed the concept of mens rea
to solely address intent and consequently disregarded moral blameworthiness altogether.322 Rather than acknowledge the dual nature of mens rea, and as a result of
confusion over the proper and historical two-fold nature of mens rea, some states
have collapsed the two components into a single concept that strictly refers to the
mental element (intent) of the charged offense.323 Indeed, in the four states that lack
the insanity defense, a mens rea doctrine exists, but the doctrine speaks only to intent.324 Moral blameworthiness is not given weight in any of those states. In effect,
the historic and fundamental principle of criminal law that mentally insane defendants are not morally blameworthy, and thus should not be held criminally responsible, has been abandoned in those states.
And yet, the failure to incorporate both aspects of mens rea is a violation of
the Due Process Clause.325 A statute or some other kind of state action infringes
due process rights if it “offends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 326 Given that the
dual nature of mens rea is rooted in both common law and ancient history, it is indeed a fundamental principle of justice. 327 Therefore, the insanity defense is protected by due process. While the Idaho Supreme Court in Searcy recognized that
the insanity defense has “a long and varied history during its development in the
common law,” the court found that due to its lack of uniformity, the insanity defense is not so deeply rooted in American legal history.328 But what the court fails
to appreciate is that while the insanity defense has taken many forms throughout
English common law and American history, every jurisdiction in England and the
United States, at some point, has adopted a variation of the insanity defense,329 thus
recognizing it as an essential defense and fundamental principle of criminal law.
While some states have since abolished the insanity defense, there is a modern
trend to again adopt the insanity defense and rule the ban on the insanity defense
unconstitutional. 330 Indeed, even today all but four states have the insanity defense.331 As such, Idaho’s abolition of the insanity defense is unconstitutional be320. Id. at 505.
321. See id.
322. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2014).
323. Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 469–70.
324. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2014).
325. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
326. Phillips & Woodman, supra note 131, at 462–63.
327. See id. at 469, 494.
328. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 917–19, 118 Idaho 632, 635–37 (1990).
329. Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of “Abolishing” the Insanity Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1538 (2002).
330. See generally Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66
(Nev. 2001); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910).
331. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West 2014).
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cause it violates due process. In order to comply with the Due Process Clause, Idaho should again adopt an insanity defense.
VI. THE INSANITY DEFENSE WOULD SAVE IDAHO MONEY
Constitutional issues aside, adopting the insanity defense would serve Idaho’s
financial interests in the long run.332 While the annual costs of housing and treating
a mentally insane patient in a state hospital are more than housing and treating a
mentally insane inmate in prison, effective rehabilitation in a state hospital would
ultimately save money.333 And because the money that goes into the prison system
comes from tax dollars, all of society is invested in the issue of imprisoning mentally insane criminals.334
In 2013, according to the Idaho Department of Correction, the average cost to
house a prisoner in Idaho, per day, was $55.50.335 Per year, this averages out to
approximately $20,250 per prisoner. On the other hand, state hospitals cost approximately $90,000-$100,000 per year to house a patient. 336 Thus, while looking solely
at the surface of these figures, some states have been economically incentivized to
send mentally insane criminals to prisons rather than state mental hospitals. 337
But prisons spend more money on housing and treating mentally insane prisoners than other prisoners.338 In 2013, about 33% of the prison population in the
Idaho Department of Correction consisted of prisoners with mental health needs. 339
The numbers are up since 2012, when 27% of the prison population had mental
health needs.340 That year, almost half of the 27% of prisoners with mental health
needs needed special housing or treatment. 341 Special housing or treatment adds
extra costs to prisons.342 In Idaho, the cost per-inmate to treat mental health needs
332. See Simon McCormack, Prison Population Reduction Must Be Coupled with Effective Rehab,
Experts
Say,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
21,
2012
1:04
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/21/prison-population-reduction-rehab_n_1613643.html (quoting
Robert Weisberg, a Stanford law professor, “Weisberg also said that deficit hawks should pony up money
for rehabilitation and job training programs because it could end up cutting costs in the long term.”); see
also Rose Hoban, NC State Study Shows Why it Costs Less to Treat Mentally Ill than Incarcerate Them,
N.C. HEALTH NEWS (July 1, 2013), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2013/07/01/nc-state-studyshows-why-it-costs-less-to-treat-mentally-ill-than-incarcerate-them/ (quoting Sarah Desmarais, an assistant
professor of psychology at N.C. State, “[I]t’s more cost efficient to give treatment instead of [relying on]
criminal justice . . . treating the mentally ill is less expensive.”).
333. See McCormack, supra note 332.
334. Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (April 12, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=2783.
335. IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2013, at 4, available at
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/annual_report_fy13.
336. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 293, at 25 (quoting Dr. Fred Maue, the chief of clinical
services at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections).
337. See id.
338. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Managing Prison Health Care Spending, PEWSTATES.ORG:
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(Oct.
2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2014/PCTCorrectionsHealthcareBrief05
0814pdf.pdf.
339. IDAHO DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 335, at 6.
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Mental Health Services?, THE BLUE REV. (June 24, 2013), http://thebluereview.org/idaho-mental-healthservice/.
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342. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 338, at 8.

602

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51

rose to approximately $4,188 in 2012.343 If that number did not change much in
2013, the total cost to house and treat such inmates adds up to around $24,500
when factoring in both mental health services and regular bed costs. But the costs
may be bigger now or may continue to grow. Indeed, the average cost for treating
and housing seriously mentally ill prisoners in America is approximately $35,000
per person a year. 344 And, as explained in Part IV.D., defendants may end up
spending more time in prison than a mental hospital, where they may be released
when they are proven to no longer be a threat to themselves and their community,
whereas in prisons they are required to serve their entire sentence. 345 Thus, it is
more expensive to incarcerate a mentally ill prisoner than other prisoners. 346
But is it more expensive to place mentally insane defendants in mental hospitals, as opposed to prisons? As the numbers demonstrate, per year, yes.347 As previously noted, state hospitals across America, on average, cost about $90,000$100,000 to house patients.348 But, as illustrated in Part IV.A., mental hospital patients receive better treatment and are more effectively rehabilitated than prison
inmates. And when inmates are effectively treated and rehabilitated, once they are
released back into their communities, they are less likely to commit more crimes.349
Less crime in society saves money. 350 And, also illustrated in Part IV.D., state hospitals may not hold onto patients as long as prisons would hold onto them, depending on when the patients can demonstrate they are no longer a threat to themselves
and their communities. Indeed, when patients are better rehabilitated and treated,
they are released into society sooner and their recidivism rates are lower. 351 Thus,
with lower recidivism rates, fewer offenders enter back into the expensive prison
system.352
Further, an insanity defense would preclude mentally insane murderers from
going through the expensive process of capital litigation. Idaho is one of thirty-two
states that administers the death penalty.353 Due to the cost of state-paid lawyers,
appeals, hearings, and other legal fees, death penalty cases are more expensive than
any other kind of litigation, especially because a life is at stake.354 And death penalty cases last many years, with the average case lasting twenty-one years just be-

343. Id. at 5.
344. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 293, at 25 (quoting Dr. Fred Maue, the chief of clinical
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tween sentencing and execution. 355 In fact, in Idaho, one inmate, Gene Stuart,
joined death row in 1982 – thirty-two years ago.356
The combination of various legal fees with the long life span of death penalty
cases leads to shocking costs – approximately $2 million for each death penalty
case in America.357 In Idaho, taxpayers spend millions of dollars towards capital
litigation.358 But if mentally insane murderers were committed to mental institutions rather than thrown on death row, ultimately taxpayers would avoid funding
expensive executions and the drawn-out legal process that comes with them. 359
Currently, some of the current death row inmates are mentally ill.360 For instance,
the Chief Psychologist at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution determined that
inmate Timothy Dunlap has a “psychiatric illness requiring treatment.” 361 The psychologist further determined that Dunlap needs to be housed in the mental health
unit due to his mental illness. 362 In addition to Dunlap, death row inmate David
Card is mentally insane.363 Specifically, he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. 364
Card has been on death row since 1989, and Dunlap since 1992.365 But the insanity
defense would have likely sent these two inmates to a mental institution, rather than
to death row.366
VII. CONCLUSION
Mentally insane criminals in Idaho have little hope of rehabilitation and becoming law-abiding members of their communities without an insanity defense in
place. Instead, these criminals are sent to prison where their mental conditions likely worsen. And if they are released back into society, their exacerbated mental conditions increase their likelihood of ending back up in prison, costing the state more
money and failing to reduce crime rates. 367
But Idaho can solve such problems by again adopting an insanity defense that
incorporates the dual nature of mens rea, intent and moral blameworthiness.
Through doing so, Idaho would ensure that those who are precluded from criminal
responsibility, such as mentally insane defendants who lack both intent and the
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million to imprison somebody for life, but a death penalty case may cost five times that.”).
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ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their crimes, are not punished. And
through recognizing the dual nature of mens rea, Idaho would promote fundamental
principles of criminal law and, in turn, enforce due process of the law.
Even more, adopting the insanity defense would advance the goals of punishment. By adequately treating mentally insane criminals, the insanity defense
would promote rehabilitation. In John Cope’s case, the man who believed God
commanded him to kill “the mark of the beast,” 368 the trial judge could have committed Cope to a state mental hospital to effectively treat his severe mental conditions. Instead, with no insanity defense statute in place, the trial judge had no
choice but to sentence Cope to prison. Additionally, by giving mentally insane
criminals what they truly deserve—treatment in a secure location—an insanity defense in Idaho would promote retribution. While Cope committed a heinous crime,
his crime was a product of religious delusions. Cope does not deserve to be locked
behind prison bars and subjected to prison conditions, which would ultimately
worsen his mental conditions. Rather, Cope deserves to be committed to a hospital
that will treat his conditions, help him cope with his delusions, and steer him away
from future criminal conduct. But instead, Idaho’s only intention with Cope is to
keep him in prison until he dies.
Also, by keeping mentally insane criminals off the streets until they are no
longer a threat to themselves and their communities, the insanity defense in Idaho
would promote incapacitation. While Cope is behind bars, the state of Idaho is paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep him there for the duration of his life.
And yet, Cope’s mental conditions are likely deteriorating even more than when the
state first sentenced him to prison. But if Cope were sent to a mental institution,
Cope would still be isolated from his community in a secured facility. Lastly, while
the insanity defense does not necessarily promote deterrence, deterrence fails to
justify a ban on the insanity defense. If a paranoid schizophrenic learned of Cope’s
punishment, but suffered from similar religious delusions, he would not be deterred
from committing violent crime because his mental conditions would prevent rational thought from reminding him of the punishment he would get from committing the crime.
Cope’s similarities to Robert Serravo, the mentally insane man who attempted
to murder his wife in order to carry out his mission from God, suggest that the two
men would be similarly treated by the justice system. Both men committed crimes
motivated by religious delusions. Both men recognized the criminality of their conduct, but failed to appreciate the nature and quality of their crimes because they
were blinded by mental insanity. Yet Serravo was rehabilitated in a mental hospital,
while Cope was punished in prison. These inconsistent outcomes are due to Idaho’s
ban on the insanity defense. But to better promote justice and advance the goals of
punishment, to implement due process guarantees, to save Idaho money, and to
recognize the historical, dual-nature of mens rea, Idaho should again adopt the insanity defense and declare its current ban on the insanity defense unconstitutional.

368.

Supra Part I.
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